pneumonic plague, under proper conditions, disrupts and is capable of decimating a community as few other epidemics can. It is understandable, then, that Dickie should take pride in the accomplishments of those responsible for containing the epidemic. But Dickie's report, submitted almost two years after the outbreak, is susceptible to "historical drift." In order to evaluate more properly the validity and appropriateness of Dickie's encomium, this paper will chronicle and analyze the events which occurred in Los Angeles, taking special cognizance of the social, administrative, and epidemiologic features of this last major epidemic of pneumonic plague in the United States.
I
On October 29, 1924 , a physician requested an ambulance from the Los Angeles County General Hospital for Two Mexican patients critically ill of a malady which he could not definitely diagnose, but which he knew to be highly contagious since several others in the neighborhood were also affected with similar symptoms of very high fever and pains in the back and chest. The following day 13 other cases displaying the same symptoms were detected and subsequently admitted to the hospital, where they all developed signs of severe pneumonia, with bloody expectoration and marked cyanosis. It was during this day, after three of the 15 patients who had been admitted had died, that the diagnosis of pneumonic plague was first suggested. The diagnosis was confirmed the following morning, but not made public, when the staff pathologist performed an autopsy and reported the presence of gram-negative bipolar staining bacilli characteristic of plague in the lungs of one of the deceased patients (1 ) .
The United States Public Health Service and the State Board of Health first learned of the diagnosis somewhat indirectly. On October 31, telegrams were sent from the assistant superintendent of the hospital to federal and state authorities and to medical supply dealers inquiring where plague serum and vaccine could be obtained. On November 1, Benjamin Brown, the Public Health Service surgeon stationed in Los Angeles, having confirmed the information contained in the telegram, wired the Surgeon General in code as follows: "Eighteen cases ekkil [pneumonic plague]. Three suspects. Ten begos [deaths] . Ethos [situation bad]. Recommend federal aid" (2) . The Surgeon General immediately wired instructions to Senior Surgeon James Perry, stationed in San Francisco, to proceed to Los Angeles where he was to investigate quitely and be certain to keep the source of his information confidential. The Service, according to protocol and statute, did not wish to involve itself in state affairs unless officially invited or prescribed by law to do so (3) .
On the same day, Dr. William Dickie, secretary of the State Board of Health, read in the morning newspapers that a "strange illness" had broken out in Los Angeles which had taken the lives of nine people and which threatened the lives of eight others. The unnamed ailment, which was being investigated by city health officers, resembled pneumonia but "ran its course much faster." In a wire to Dr. Elmer Pascoe, acting health officer of the Los Angeles Health Department, Dickie inquired: "Kindly wire immediately cause of death of Lucena Samarano." The reply was equally polite and laconic, "Death L. S. caused by Bacillus pestis" (4).
At 1:00 a.m., November 2, the Macy Street area, which included approximately eight city blocks and which housed approximately 2,500 Mexicans, was placed in quarantine by the City Health Department. All cases Qf illness occurring within the area were examined by health department physicians and suspicious cases sent to the County Hospital. The Los Angeles County Board of Charities provided seven-day rations for each household and sought to establish "cubicle isolation" for each house within the quarantine area (5) . With the cooperation of the Catholic Board of Charities, a Span-sh-speaking priest and social worker were placed in the area to reassure and calm the anxious, residents. Public health nurses were also sent to the area and directed to make a house to house inspection in an endeavor to locate other cases or contacts (6) .
Arrangements were made with the County General Hospital to admit all persons who lived at addresses where pneumonic plague had occurred. A total of 114 contacts were admitted but none became ill with plague. Accordingly to the state epidemiologist, the inhabitants recognized the highly contagious nature of the disease and avoided intimate contact (7) . Early hospitalization of cases and self-imposed isolation were considered by the authorities as helping to contain the epidemic. Los Angeles County Medical Society, on the urging of the State Board, assembled in special session to hear lectures on the etiology, signs, symptoms, and therapy of the three varieties of plague (12) .
City health officers who released the story already had a confirmed diagnosis of pneumonic plague but chose for obvious reasons to refer to the disease, from November 1 to November 5, as the "strange malady," "pneumonia," "virulent pneumonia," or "malignant pneumonia." Not until November 6, when the epidemic appeared to have run its course, did Los Angeles newspapers refer to the disease properly as pneumonic plague and even then justified their evasion by adding that pneumonic plague was the 'technical term" for "malignant pneumonia" ( 13 the epidemic on its weekly radio show. Unabashedly referring to pneumonic plague as the "celebrated black death of the 14th century, in which one-quarter of the European population was destroyed," the narrator proceeded to discuss in layman's terms the three types of plague, bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic, the role of the flea and the rat, and describe in detail the measures that officials had taken to contain the epidemic in Los Angeles. Despite the virulence of the pneumonic variety and the potential danger, concluded the health officer, pneumonic plague fortunately did not flourish in dry climates, such as Los Angeles, where there is comparatively little moisture in the air (15) .
In Washington, the Public Health Service's Sanitary Board met to discuss the situation as reported in the Los Angeles dispatches. It was the opinion of the Board that a ground squirrel and rat survey be made in Los Angeles and neighboring counties, and especially of Los Angeles' harbor in San Pedro, to determine the extent of infection. The Board believed that Senior Surgeons Perry and Wayson, both seasoned and experienced officers, could be relied upon to carry out all necessary procedures and that no detailed instructions needed to be sent to them (16) .
II
On November 3, Perry, accompanied by Surgeon Newton Wayson, arrived in Los Angeles and met with Dr. Dickie, and with representatives of the City and County Health Departments and the Chamber of Commerce in the office of the mayor. It was agreed that all plague control work was to be coordinated by an Advisory Committe composed of Dickie, Perry, and representatives of the City and County Health Departments and the County General Hospital. In Dickie's Biennial Report he notes that "all control work" was placed under his direction, but the records reveal that formal control was not transferred to the State until November 21. On the 3rd, as a result of the meeting establishing the Advisory Committee, it is difficult to determine just who was in charge since jurisdictional disputes were evident from the start, compounded by the fact that only a few weeks prior to the outbreak, Los Angeles' Health Officer, Dr. Luther Powers, had died and the City only recently had appointed an acting health officer, Dr. Elmer Pascoe, in his place (17) .
The Advisory Committe on the 3rd issued a plan of operation, which included the following. Perry sent White his address in a cable mailed on the 5th and, later that day, sent another cable describing the control measures taken by the Advisory Committee (20) .
Between the time of the original reprimand to Perry on the 3rd and November 6, Perry continued to wire factual information to Washington. On the 7th, however, he wrote a three-page letter in which he justified his actions and expressed his own dissatisfaction with White's apparent lack of confidence in his ability. Perry wrote that it was he who had recommended the establishment of the Advisory Committee and sought to coordinate eradication measures; that neither the city nor the state wanted the Public Health Service to take charge of the operation, especially since Dickie, believing he was filling the vacuum created by Power's death, was "keenly desirous" of taking complete control himself; and that the delay in responding to Washington had been further justified since there was some doubt that pneumonic plague actually existed! The surgeon who accompanied Perry to Los Angeles, Dr. Newton Wayson, was an expert in identifying plague organisms and, upon arriving in the city, went promptly to the hospital to confirm the original diagnosis. Wayson subsequently reported to Perry that "a few" bipolar organisms were visible on the prepared slides but since they had been so poorly stained and since there had been no animal inoculation, he believed, as did the state bacteriologist, W returned to Washington and resumed his post as Surgeon General. The letter obviously had a cathartic affect on Perry, but too much was happening in the early days of November for Perry to rest easy. Dr. Dickie, for whom Perry earlier had expressed high regard, soon became the object of Perry's attention and the correspondence from November 7 to mid-December reveals a new conflict: Perry vs Dickie.
In a telegram sent to Washington on November 10, Perry conveyed certain confidential "personal impressions" about the management of the epidemic. Dickie and other city and state health officers believed that the epidemic eventually would be traced to infected squirrels, as it had during the Oakland pneumonic plague epidemic of 1919 (23) . If such was the case, then the epidemic, if localized by careful quarantine, would be over when the last case was isolated in the hospital. Prompt containment of the epidemic, wrote Perry, would work to the credit of Dr. Dickie, whose term had expired and reappointment not yet been made. Perry might have cited the additional fact that Dr. Pascoe, acting city health officer, was also interested in a favorable press since he, too, was in line for promotion. Indeed, there seemed to be developing a growing friction between the three principal players, Dickie, Pascoe and Perry (24 (27) . At least the state, wrote Perry, recognized the gravity and the necessity of a long campaign (28) . But there is no doubt that Perry believed he was choosing between the lesser of two evils.
If Perry was absolutely impartial, he would have recognized earlier the important role played by Dickie. Perry, for example, had not been present on November 15 when Dickie addressed a meeting attended by the mayor, the City Council and representatives of the Chamber of Commerce. Before this assembly, Dickie warned that the plague would bring financial ruin to Los Angeles if prompt action was not taken. "There is no disease known that has such an effect upon the business world as plague," he said. The harbor will be quarantined, boats will not be permitted to dock, goods will rot in warehouses, and businesses will go bankrupt as long as there is even the suspicion of plague. It is imperative he added, that rats be eradicated and houses be rat proofed. The entire Macy Street area and areas like it in the city should be condemned and restored so that they would be fit for human habitation. Dickie concluded that the cost of the clean-up and eradication campaign would be $500,000. Nothing less will restore the confidence of the world in Los Angeles than an expenditure of such magnitude, he concluded (29) . It was the threat of a quarantined port, then, that had convinced the Council to appropriate $250,000, half the sum requested by Dickie, for plague control. It should be of no surprise that most of the trapping and rat proofing operations initially took place in the harbor and not in the Macy Street district. Shacks in the area were indeed condemned and demolished, and dwellings fumigated and rat proofed but most of the early effort was reserved for the harbor district. Ironically, the first plague rat in the harbor area was not found until December 29, trapped on a hog ranch located four miles from the harbor. So intimidated was the City Council and the Harbor Commission that the ranch was completely demolished and relocated 10 miles from the harbor (30 Board's request for increased appropriations, due largely to the antagonistic attitude of the governor. Third, since Dickie himself had expressed concern about the lack of a qualified bacteriologist, he was asked to turn over the laboratory operation to the Service. Creel believed Dickie might apply to the Service for a bacteriologist to work on a temporary basis, but Dickie finessed the question. In the back of his mind he feared the proverbial camel sticking its head under the tent. For reasons that were perhaps both chauvinistic and pragmatic, Dickie subsequently was able to bring Professor Karl Meyer of the University of California into the picture. He might have reasoned as follows. The state should have complete control; Meyer is a professor at the state's own University; the legislature would be pleased because its own employees will be in charge of key operations; their pleasure might be reflected in larger appropriations to the State Board of Health. Meyer, incidentally, was agreeable to the plan for reasons of his own. According to Wayson, he saw himself as the head of a new School of Public Health at Berkeley, which was being proposed at that time before the state legislature (31) . Fourth, the Service in no way could wrest control from the state since the Service was bound by the 1893 Act authorizing the president ". . . to adopt such measures as in his judgment shall be necessary to prevent the introduction or spread of diseases, and may detail or appoint officers for that purpose; but only in the event that the state or the municipal authorities shall fail or refuse to enforce its own rules and regulations . . ," which Los Angeles and the state had not done. And fifth, quarantine was justifiable so long as rodent plague existed in Los Angeles. This latter point was to be raised whenever the campaign seemed to falter (32) .
Although Creel seemed sanguine after the meeting, Perry remained skeptical. His interpretation differed markedly from Creel's. The conference, he wrote, was "without tangible result." Dickie had not accepted the Service's offer to take over his laboratory, which both Perry and Wayson believed to be central to the eradication campaign. Moreover, the fact that Dickie had admitted he might be able to capitalize on the epidemic to increase the state's appropriations to the State Board of Health was interpreted by Perry as indicating the baseness of Dickie's motives (33) .
Perry continued in this critical vein in succeeding weeks. He repeatedly returned to points he had made earlier; namely, that the Service representative in Los Angeles be merely an "observer" and not serve in an advisory capacity, that Dickie's resources were too limited to mount an effective eradication campaign and that Dickie's motives were based primarily on ambition.
On December 6, Cumming authorized Perry, Creel and Wayson to serve as a Committee of Three to prepare a formal report on the adequacy of the plague eradication measures for official Service use (34) . The committee completed its report on December 11 and transmitted its finding to Cumming. Despite Creel's moderating influence, the report seemed more a reflection of Perry's original positions: that Dickie was a marginal and absentee administrator; that the supervision of the campaign was casual and periodic and suffered from the lack of a sustained effort; that there was precious little cooperation and uniformity of procedure; and that the scope, practice and efficiency of the field and laboratory work were inadequate. Moreover, he wrote, the harbor was located 22 miles from the site of the epidemic, being connected to the municipality by a narrow, railroad track wide strip of land that passed through sparsely settled regions. Overlooking the fact that freight trains and laborers made many round trips between the city and the harbor, the letter concluded by assuring Armstrong that the Committee of Three's report was "ridiculous" and "without foundation in fact." He urged that every effort be made in Washington to remove the quarantine, "as shipping was being seriously affected" (38) .
After the new year, Ebright followed Dickie's advice and invited Cumming to Los Angeles to acquaint himself personally with the rodent situation (39 Mexican who had fallen ill on October 1, and his daughter, both of whose symptoms had been misdiagnosed. The daughter's "lobar pneumonia," from which she succumbed on October 5, was actually a secondary plague pneumonia and the father's "veneral bubo" was bubonic plague. When the father was examined on October 31, pus was still draining from a sinus at the site of the bubo. Microscopic examination revealed characteristic plague organisms and animal diagnosis verified the diagnosis of bubonic plague. Both cases were believed to be the origin of the series of cases of pneumonic plague in the Macy Street District.
In the conclusion to his report, Dickie wrote this final sentence: "Local, state and federal officials who have engaged in plague work in California may view with satisfaction and look back with some degree of pardonable pride on the results accomplished [here] " (47) . One No infected rats had been found in the harbor when Cumming had declared the port "plague infected" on December 22, despite the fact that trapping operations had begun on November 5. The potential for an outbreak to occur in the port, the need to protect shipping and abide by international sanitary treaty obligations, and Cumming's own vulnerability, doubtless prompted the order, but it would be difficult not to assume that the Service also needed a favorable press to maintain its own image as the health guardian of the nation, a press which would be viewed favorably by Congressional Committee at annual budget sessions. One even wonders if Dr. Dickie believed his own conclusions, for he had been discredited by both the Service and the Los Angeles press. Yet among his peers within the state, Dickie emerged as the hero. Dr. James Pomeroy, Los Angeles County health officer, in 1926 praised Dickie's work on behalf of a beleagured city (48) . And If we return to evaluate Dickie's encomium, "that the management of this epidemic represented the most outstanding accomplishment of California's health officers," we appreciate that much more was involved and at stake than the official reports reveal. Interpreted in this way, Dickie's statement is gratuitous at best and at the very least misleading, albeit understandably so.
